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Abstract
Background
Use of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery has rapidly increased during the last
decade. Understanding the causes of adverse events and their impact on patients in robot-
assisted surgery will help improve systems and operational practices to avoid incidents in
the future.
Methods
By developing an automated natural language processing tool, we performed a comprehen-
sive analysis of the adverse events reported to the publicly available MAUDE database
(maintained by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration) from 2000 to 2013. We determined
the number of events reported per procedure and per surgical specialty, the most common
types of device malfunctions and their impact on patients, and the potential causes for cata-
strophic events such as patient injuries and deaths.
Results
During the study period, 144 deaths (1.4% of the 10,624 reports), 1,391 patient injuries
(13.1%), and 8,061 device malfunctions (75.9%) were reported. The numbers of injury and
death events per procedure have stayed relatively constant (mean = 83.4, 95% confidence
interval (CI), 74.2–92.7 per 100,000 procedures) over the years. Surgical specialties for
which robots are extensively used, such as gynecology and urology, had lower numbers of
injuries, deaths, and conversions per procedure than more complex surgeries, such as car-
diothoracic and head and neck (106.3 vs. 232.9 per 100,000 procedures, Risk Ratio = 2.2,
95% CI, 1.9–2.6). Device and instrument malfunctions, such as falling of burnt/broken
pieces of instruments into the patient (14.7%), electrical arcing of instruments (10.5%), unin-
tended operation of instruments (8.6%), system errors (5%), and video/imaging problems
(2.6%), constituted a major part of the reports. Device malfunctions impacted patients in
terms of injuries or procedure interruptions. In 1,104 (10.4%) of all the events, the procedure
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was interrupted to restart the system (3.1%), to convert the procedure to non-robotic tech-
niques (7.3%), or to reschedule it (2.5%).
Conclusions
Despite widespread adoption of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery in the U.S.,
a non-negligible number of technical difficulties and complications are still being experi-
enced during procedures. Adoption of advanced techniques in design and operation of
robotic surgical systems and enhanced mechanisms for adverse event reporting may
reduce these preventable incidents in the future.
Introduction
During the last 14 years, over 1.75 million robotic procedures were performed in the United
States across various surgical specialties [1]. Surgical robots enable conducting complex mini-
mally invasive procedures with better visualization, increased precision, and enhanced dexter-
ity compared to laparoscopy. Robotic devices provide 3-dimensional magnified views of the
surgical field and translate the surgeon’s hand, wrist, and finger movements into precisely engi-
neered movements of miniaturized surgical instruments inside patient’s body. The Intuitive
Surgical’s da Vinci robot [2] is currently the only surgical robot approved by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), for performing various types of procedures in urologic, gyneco-
logic, general, cardiothoracic, and head and neck surgery. There are also other robotic systems
designed for minimally invasive surgery in areas such as neurosurgery and orthopedic surgery
(e.g. MAKO Surgical’s RIO Robotic Arm Interactive System for orthopedic surgery [3]) or for
research in tele-operated robotic surgery (e.g. the da Vinci research kit [4] and the RAVEN II
surgical robot [5][6]).
This study focuses on assessing the safety and effectiveness of robotic surgical systems used
in minimally invasive surgery, by analyzing safety incidents experienced during robotic proce-
dures. We retrieved all the nation-wide adverse event reports collected by the publicly available
FDAMAUDE database [7] over the 14-year period of 2000–2013. We estimated the prevalence
of incidents, including deaths, injuries, and device malfunctions over the years and across six
major surgical specialties of gynecology, urology, general, colorectal, cardiothoracic, and head
and neck surgery. We further characterized the potential causes for incidents and measured
their impact on patients and on the progress of surgery.
There have been previous studies on safety and effectiveness of robotic surgery based on the
experience of different surgical institutions as well as analyses of the FDAMAUDE data. How-
ever, an important question left unanswered is whether the evolution of the robotic systems
with new technologies and safety features over the years has improved the safety of robotic sys-
tems and their effectiveness across different surgical specialties.
Our goal is to use the knowledge gained from the analysis of past incidents to provide
insights on design of future robotic surgical systems that by taking advantage of advanced
safety mechanisms, improved human machine interfaces, and enhanced safety training and
operational practices can minimize the adverse impact on both the patients and surgical teams.
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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Background and RelatedWork
Previous studies on the safety and effectiveness of minimally invasive robotic surgery focused
on its comparison to non-robotic minimally invasive surgical methods (laparoscopy) and anal-
ysis of system failures experienced during procedures or the adverse events reported to the
FDAMAUDE database. The FDAMAUDE data collected and analyzed in this manuscript
cannot be used to determine the relative complication rates between robotic and non-robotic
surgery. A summary of related work on such comparison is provided in S1 Table. This section
presents an overview on the FDAMAUDE database and previous analyses of adverse events in
robotic surgery.
Failures of Robotic Surgical Systems
There have been several reports by individual surgical institutions on the various software-
related, mechanical, and electrical failures experienced before or during robotic procedures
[8]-[21]. S2 Table summarizes these reports by providing the number and types of procedures
performed at each center as well as the failure rates and number of cases in which failures led
to conversion or rescheduling of procedures. The rates of device malfunctions and failure-
related conversions reported by these studies varied between 0.4–8.0% and 0.1–2.7%, with an
average of 3% (95% confidence interval (CI), 1.9–4.2) and 0.9% (95% confidence interval (CI),
0.4–1.4), respectively.
Adverse Events Reports from the FDAMAUDE Database
The Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (“MAUDE”) database is a publicly
available collection of suspected medical device-related adverse event reports, submitted by
mandatory (user facilities, manufacturers, and distributors) and voluntary (health care profes-
sionals, patients, and customers) reporters to the FDA [7]. Manufacturers and the FDA
regularly monitor these reports to detect and correct device-related safety issues in a timely
manner. Each adverse event report contains information such as Device Name;Manufacturer
Name; Event Type (“Malfunction,” “Injury,” “Death,” or “Other”); Event Date; Report Date;
and human-written Event Description andManufacturer Narrative fields, which provide a
short description of the incident, as well as any comments made or follow-up actions taken by
the manufacturer to detect and address device problems [7]. Fig 1 shows an example MAUDE
report on an adverse event occurred during a robotic cardiothoracic procedure.
The FDAMAUDE database, as a spontaneous reporting system, suffers from underreport-
ing and inconsistencies [22][23][24]. However, it provides valuable insights on real incidents
that occurred during the robotic procedures and impacted patient safety. The reported data on
deaths, injuries, and device malfunctions provided by the MAUDE can be treated as a sample
set to estimate the lower bounds on the prevalence of adverse events and identify examples of
their major causes and patient impacts (see S1 File for more details on the problem of under-
reporting).
Table 1 shows summary of related work on analysis of the FDA adverse event reports on
robotic surgical systems. All these studies were performed by manual extraction and review of
subsets of the MAUDE data. Almost half of the studies only focused on specific types of device
failures (e.g., electro-cautery failures [25], electrosurgical injuries [26], and instrument failures
[27]) and only considered the gynecology and urology specialties in their analysis. To the best
of our knowledge, none of the previous studies considered the total volume of procedures per-
formed in their analysis period and none of them assessed the risk of adverse events across dif-
ferent surgical specialties and their impact on the progress of surgery. This is in part due to the
fact that adverse event descriptions in the FDAMAUDE database [7] are mainly composed of
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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free-form natural language text, written by the manufacturers and healthcare professionals,
and are often difficult to analyze without understanding semantics and the contextual factors
involved in the events. Therefore, (i) manual analysis of incident reports requires significant
amount of human effort, and (ii) often not all the contributing causes for incidents can be iden-
tified from the reports.
Methods
We developed a natural language processing tool that automatically retrieves all the reported
events on robotic surgical systems from the FDA MAUDE database and extracts important
safety information from the reports, including types of patient complications, surgical spe-
cialties and types of robotic procedures, most common types of system malfunctions, and the
actions taken by the surgical teams to recover from failures. Our natural language parsing
Fig 1. An example adverse event report from the publicly available FDAMAUDE database. This report is accessible through the online FDAMAUDE
database at: http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/Detail.cfm?MDRFOI__ID=2240665. Other MAUDE reports can also be accessed
through searching the online database: http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/TextSearch.cfm.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.g001
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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tool enables large-scale analysis of nation-wide incidents reported to the FDA over any tim-
ing period and, thus, facilitates more accurate estimation of the prevalence of incidents over
the years and more effective evaluation of robotic surgical systems across different surgical
specialties.
We extracted the reports related to the systems and instruments used in minimally invasive
robotic surgery by searching for related keywords (e.g. device and manufacturer names) in
the Device Name andManufacturer Name fields of over 2.9 million MAUDE records posted
between January 2000 and December 2013. That led us to an initial list of adverse event reports,
from which we filtered out those with duplicate database keys (reporting the same adverse
event for multiple devices). In addition to the structured information that was directly available
from the reports, we extracted further information from the unstructured human-written
descriptions of events by natural language parsing of the Event Description andManufacturer
Narrative fields (see Fig 1). As shown in Fig 2, our natural language processing tool combines
domain knowledge with linguistic rules to interpret the semantics of the event descriptions.
This was done by creating several domain-specific dictionaries (e.g., for patient complications,
surgery types [32], surgical instruments [33], and malfunction types) as well as syntactic rules,
parts-of-speech (POS) taggers, and negation detectors [34]. The results generated by each step
of our automated analysis tool were manually reviewed for accuracy and validity.
More specifically, we extracted the following information from the reports:
• Patient injury (such as burns, cuts, or damage to organs) and death events that were
reported under another Event Type, such as “Malfunction” or “Other”.
• Surgical specialty and type of robotic procedure during which the adverse events occurred.
• Major types of device or instrument malfunctions (e.g., falling of burnt/broken pieces of
instruments into patients’ bodies or electrical arcing of instruments)
Table 1. Related work on analysis of the FDA adverse event reports on robotic surgical systems.
Study No. Reports (Years) System Under
Study
Surgical
Specialties
Major Results
Murphy et al.
[25]
38 system failures, 78
adverse events (2006–
2007)
da Vinci system N/A Most of these events were related to broken instrument tips or
failures of electrocautery elements.
Andonian et al.
[28]
189 (2000–2007) ZEUS and da Vinci
systems
N/A Estimated failure rate of 0.38% for robotic-assisted laparoscopic
surgeries.
Lucas et al.
[29]
1,914 (2003 − 2009) da Vinci system
models dV and dVs
N/A Both device malfunctions and open conversions were reduced by
increased robotic experience and newer surgical systems. The
number of patient injuries did not change and the number of
deaths increased.
Fuller et al. [26] 605 (2001–2011) da Vinci system N/A 24 (3.9%) of reports were related to electrosurgical injuries (ESI),
of which 37.5% resulted in surgical intervention.
Friedman et al.
[27]
565 (2009–2010) da Vinci Instruments N/A The majority of events were related to the instrument wrist or tip
(285), 174 were related to cautery problems, 76 were shaft
failures, and the rest were cable and control housing failures (36).
Gupta et al.
[30]
741 (2009–2010) da Vinci system Urology,
Gynecology
The events were related to the use of energy instruments (43.5%),
surgical systems (19.3%), and the instruments (11.7%). The
severity of events was correlated with the type of surgery and the
type of device.
Manoucheri
et al. [31]
50 injuries/deaths
(2006–2012)
da Vinci system Gynecology The majority of injuries (65%) were not directly related to use of
robot; 21% were related to operator error; and 14% were due to
technical system failures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.t001
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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Fig 2. Data extraction and analysis flow from the FDAMAUDE database. The dictionaries of keywords for surgery types/specialties and surgical
instruments were constructed based on the online information available on the da Vinci surgeries [32] and instruments catalog [33] from the manufacturer.
The analysis tool was developed using open-source Python libraries for natural language processing, data analysis, and machine learning.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.g002
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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• Adverse events that caused an interruption in the progress of surgery, by leading the surgi-
cal team to troubleshoot technical problems (e.g., restarting the system), convert the proce-
dure to non-robotic surgical approaches (e.g., laparoscopy or open surgery), or abort the
procedure and reschedule it to a later time.
We compared the number of adverse events (in general) and injury/death events and proce-
dure conversions (in particular) per 100,000 procedures across different surgical specialties.
The rate of events was estimated by dividing the number of adverse events that occurred in
each year (based on the Event Date) by the annual number of robotic procedures performed in
the U.S. The total number of procedures per year was extracted from the device manufacturer’s
reports [1][35] for 2004–2013 (see S1 Fig). The annual number of procedures per surgical spe-
cialty was available only for gynecology, urology, and general surgery after 2007. So we esti-
mated a combined annual number of procedures for cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery
by assuming that the majority of the remaining procedures (other than genecology, urology,
and general) were related to these specialties, as, according to the manufacturer reports, they
are the only other specialties for which the robot has been used [1]. Due to the possible under-
reporting of the adverse events in the FDAMAUDE database (the numerator) and the over-
reporting of the annual number of robotic procedures in the manufacturing company investor
presentations (the denominator), the estimated rates of adverse events per procedures are con-
servative and represent the lower-bounds on the prevalence of events.
We assumed that the rate of underreporting for injury and death events are low and are
independent from the type of surgery, because the device manufacturers are required and mon-
itored by the FDA to report serious injury and death events to the MAUDE database. However,
due to possible changes in the reporting rates during the years, the total number of events per
procedure in the whole study period (rather than per year) was compared across different sur-
gical specialties. The 2-sided P values (< 0.05) and 95% confidence intervals were used to
determine the statistical significance of the results. The cumulative number of malfunctions
per procedure was used to evaluate the trends in malfunction rates over 2004–2013.
To characterize the major causes to which injury and death events were attributed, we per-
formed a manual review of event descriptions for all the reports made before 2013. The cumu-
lative number of malfunctions per procedure was used to evaluate the trends in malfunction
rates over 2004–2013.
Results
We identified a total of 10,624 events related to the robotic systems and instruments, reported
over 2000–2013. About 98% of the events were reported by device manufacturers and distribu-
tors, and the rest (2%) were voluntary reports. In the same period, over 1,745,000 robotic pro-
cedures were performed in the U.S., so the estimated number of adverse events per procedure
was less than 0.6% (95% confidence interval (CI), 0.6–0.62).
Data included 1,535 (14.4%) adverse events with significant negative patient impacts,
including injuries (1,391 cases) and deaths (144 cases), and over 8,061 (75.9%) device malfunc-
tions. For the rest of the events (1,028 cases), the Event Type information either was not avail-
able or was indicated as “Other.” We identified 160 adverse events (1.5%) that included some
kind of patient injuries but were reported as a “Malfunction” or “Other.”
Trends in Adverse Event Reports
Fig 3 shows the overall trends in the annual numbers of reports and the estimated rates of
events per 100,000 procedures over 2004–2013:
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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• The absolute number of reports made per year has significantly increased (about 32 times)
since 2006, reaching 58 deaths, 938 patient injuries, and 4,124 malfunctions in 2013. The
number of robotic procedures performed per year has increased 10-fold in the same period
[1][35].
• While the annual average number of adverse events was about 550 per 100,000 procedures
(95% confidence interval (CI), 410–700) between 2004 and 2011, in 2013 it peaked at about
1,000 events per 100,000 procedures (1 event reported in every 100 procedures).
• The numbers of injury and death events per procedure have stayed relatively constant since
2007 (mean = 83.4 per 100,000 procedures, 95% CI, 74.2–92.7).
Adverse Events across Different Surgical Specialties
Table 2 shows the numbers of adverse events reported in different surgical specialties and their
impact on patients (injuries or deaths) and progress of surgery (procedure conversion or
rescheduling). The last row shows examples of the most common types of procedures reported
in each specialty.
Fig 3. Annual Numbers of Adverse Event Reports and Rates of Events per Procedure. The left Y-axis corresponds to the bars showing the absolute
numbers of adverse events (based on the years that reports were received by the FDA). The right Y-axis corresponds to the trend lines showing (in
logarithmic scale) the annual number of adverse events per 100,000 procedures (based on the year the events occurred). Numbers on the bars indicate
number of deaths reported per year. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the proportion estimates. Because of the small number of injury and
death events reported for 2004 and 2005, a combined rate was calculated for 2004–2006. Note that of all the events, 40 were reported as part of the articles
or the legal disputes received by the manufacturer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.g003
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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• The majority of reports were related to gynecology (30.1%), urology (14.7%), and cardiotho-
racic (3.7%) surgeries, such as hysterectomy (2,331), prostatectomy (1,291), and thoracic
(110) procedures, respectively. The higher percentage of adverse events in gynecologic and
urologic surgeries could be explained by the higher number of these procedures performed
(86% of all the robotic procedures performed in the U.S.) compared to other surgical special-
ties (less than 14.2% of all procedures) [1].
Table 2. Adverse events in different surgical specialties: Deaths, injuries, malfunctions, procedure conversion or rescheduling, common types of
surgery.
No. (%) [95% Conﬁdence Interval]
Gynecology Urology Cardiothoracic Head & Neck Colorectal General N/A
3,194 1,565 393 71 301 197 4,903
Overall a (30.1) (14.7) (3.7) (0.7) (2.8) (1.9) (46.2)
[29.2–31.0] [14.0–15.4] [3.3–4.1] [0.5–0.9] [2.5–3.1] [1.6–2.2] [45.3–
47.1]
Event Type b
Death 46 30 25 14 11 11 7
(1.4) (1.9) (6.4) (19.7) (3.7) (5.6) (0.1)
[1.0–1.8] [1.2–2.6] [4.0–8.8] [10.4–29.0] [1.6–5.8] [2.4–8.8] [0.0–
0.2]
Injury 818 272 64 14 58 56 109
(25.6) (17.4) (16.3) (19.7) (19.3) (28.4) (2.2)
[24.1–27.1] [15.5–19.3] [12.6–20.0] [10.4–29.0] [14.8–23.8] [22.1–34.7] [1.8–
2.6]
Malfunction 2,103 902 226 35 209 110 4,476
(65.8) (57.6) (57.5) (49.3) (69.4) (57.8) (91.3)
[64.2–67.4] [55.2–60.0] [52.6–62.4] [37.7–60.9] [64.2–74.6] [48.9–62.7] [90.5–
92.1]
Other 227 361 78 8 23 20 311
(7.1) (23.1) (19.8) (11.3) (7.6) (10.2) (6.3)
[6.2–8.0] [21.0–25.2] [15.9–23.8] [3.9–18.7] [4.6–10.6] [6.0–14.4] [5.6–
7.0]
236 212 66 6 29 14 217
Conversion (7.4) (13.5) (16.8) (8.5) (9.6) (7.1) (4.4)
[6.5–8.3] [11.8–15.2] [13.1–20.5] [2.0–15.0] [6.3–12.9] [3.5–10.7] [3.8–
5.0]
26 148 11 1 1 6 77
Rescheduling (0.8) (9.5) (2.8) (1.4) (0.3) (3.0) (1.6)
[0.5–1.1] [8.1–10.9] [1.2–4.4] [0–4.1] [0–1.0] [0.6–5.4] [1.3–
1.9]
Common
Surgery Types
Hysterectomy
(2,331)
Prostatectomy
(1,291)
Thoracic (110) Thyroidectomy
(19)
Cholecyst-
ectomy (118)
Hernia repair (37)
Myomectomy
(328)
Nephrectomy
(138)
Lobectomy (67) Tongue base
resection (19)
Colectomy (61) Nissen
fundoplication
(34)
Sacrocolpopexy
(170)
Pyeloplasty (31) Mitral valve repair
(54)
Transoral robotic
(18)
Low anterior
resection (44)
Gastric bypass
(28)
Oophorectomy
(120)
Cystectomy (48) Coronary artery
bypass (23)
Colon resection
(25)
Gastrectomy (15)
a Percentages are over all the adverse event reports (n = 10,624).
b Percentages are over the total adverse events reported for a surgical specialty.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.t002
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• Cardiothoracic and head and neck surgeries involved a higher number of deaths per adverse
event report (6.4% and 19.7%) than gynecology and urology (1.4 and 1.9%).
• The highest number of procedure conversions per adverse event was for cardiothoracic
(16.8%) and urology (13.5%), and the highest rates of procedure rescheduling were for urol-
ogy (9.5%), general (3.0%), and cardiothoracic (2.8%) surgeries.
Of all the reports, only 5,721 (53.8%) indicated the class and type of surgery involved. How-
ever, the majority of reports with missing information on the type of surgery were related to
device malfunctions and “Other” events (97.6%). In order to compare the rate of adverse events
across different specialties, we focused only on reports related to injuries, deaths, and proce-
dure conversions. For the majority of these events (92.2% of injury reports, 95.1% of deaths,
and 72.2% of procedure conversions), the surgery type information was available and the rest
(with ‘N/A’ surgical specialty) were removed from our analysis. In order to estimate the rate of
events per procedure, we regrouped the events into four major categories of “Gynecology,”
“Urology,” “General,” and “Cardiothoracic and Head and Neck,” according to the manufactur-
er’s reports [1][35]. The “General” category includes both colorectal and general specialties.
As shown in Table 3, for cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery, the rates of injuries,
deaths, and procedure conversions have been significantly higher than other specialties. During
2007–2013, the estimated rate of deaths have been 52.2 per 100,000 procedures for cardiotho-
racic and head and neck specialties vs. 5.7 in gynecology, urology, and general surgeries
(RR = 9.23, 95% CI, 6.35–13.40, P< 0.0001). Also, the rate of injuries and procedure conver-
sions in these specialties have been 91.0 and 89.7 per 100,000 procedures vs. 71.5 (RR = 1.27,
95% CI, 0.99–1.63, P< 0.052) and 29.2 (RR = 3.07, 95% CI, 2.38–3.97, P< 0.0001) in the other
surgical categories.
Device and Instrument Malfunctions
We identified five major categories of device and instrument malfunctions that impacted the
patients, either by causing injuries and complications or by interrupting the progress of surgery
and/or prolonging procedure times. Table 4 shows the numbers of events in each category, the
event types as indicated by reporters (including “Malfunction” (M), “Injury” (IN), “Death”
(D), and “Other” (O)), and the actions taken by the surgical team to resolve the problems. The
malfunction categories and actions taken by the surgical teams are not mutually exclusive, and
in many cases two or three different malfunctions or two actions were reported in a single
event. S2 and S3 Figs. use Venn diagrams to depict the intersections among different malfunc-
tion categories and actions taken by the surgical team.
• System errors and video/imaging problems contributed to 787 (7.4%) of the adverse events
and were the major contributors to procedure interruptions, including system resets (274
cases, 82% of all system resets), conversion of the procedures to a non-robotic approach (462
cases, 59.2% of all conversions), and aborting/rescheduling of the procedures (221 cases,
81.8% of all cases). System errors are raised by the existing safety mechanisms of the robot
upon detection of device problems that cannot be autonomously recovered from and either
require manual system reset (recoverable system errors) or stopping the robotic procedure
(non-recoverable system errors). S3 Table lists the descriptions and frequencies of the most
common system error codes that we extracted by natural language parsing of the adverse
event descriptions in the reports.
• Falling of the broken/burnt pieces into the patient’s body constituted about 1,557 (14.7%)
of the adverse events. In almost all these cases, the procedure was interrupted, and the
Safety of Robotic Surgery
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surgical team spent some time searching for the missing pieces and retrieving them from the
patient (in 119 cases, a patient injury, and in one case a death, was reported).
• Electrical arcing, sparking, or charring of instruments and burns or holes developed in the
tip cover accessories constituted 1,111 reports (10.5% of the events), leading to nearly 193
injuries, such as burning of tissues.
• Unintended operation of instruments, such as uncontrolled movements and spontaneous
powering on/off, happened in 1,078 of the adverse events (10.1%), including 52 injuries and
2 deaths.
The Other category in Table 4 represents the malfunctions that could not be classified in
any of the classes, including cable and instrument breakages that did not lead to other types of
malfunctions, electrosurgical unit and power supply problems, and patient-side manipulator
issues.
In total, 9,377 reports were about technical problems, including 1,104 cases (10.4% of all the
adverse events) in which the procedure was interrupted and additional time was spent on trou-
bleshooting the errors, resetting the system, and/or converting the procedure to a traditional
technique, or rescheduling the procedure to a later time. In 1,019 of cases (10.9% of all the mal-
functions), the device or instrument malfunction was detected prior to start of the procedure,
of which in 20 cases the procedure was rescheduled to a later time and in 2 cases it was con-
verted to a non-robotic approach.
Fig 4 shows the cumulative rates of malfunctions per procedure over 2004–2013. Overall,
the malfunction rates decreased after 2006, but the rate of cases with arcing instruments and
broken instruments followed a relatively constant trend. The sudden increase in the rate of bro-
ken instruments after the middle of 2012 could be related to changes made to the adverse event
reporting practices by the manufacturer in 2012 (mostly related to instrument cable breaks)
[36], as well as increased reporting of adverse events after concerns about the safety of robotic
surgery were raised by the FDA [37][38] and public media in early 2013 [39][40][41].
Injury and Death Causes
Amanual review of a sample set of injury and death reports (from 2000–2012) allowed us to
classify the causes indicated by reporters into three main categories: inherent risks associated
Table 3. Comparsion of adverse events rates in different surgical specialities (2007–2013).
No. (rate per 100,000 procedures) a [95% CI]
Gynecology, Urology,
General
Cardiothoracic, Head
and Neck, Other
Cardiothoracic and Head and Neck
vs. Gynecology, Urology, and General
Total Procedures 1,661,891 74,709 Relative Risk (95% Cl)b
Total Adverse Events 5,209 447 P Value
Event Type
Death 94 (5.7) 39 (52.2) 9.23 (6.35–13.40) < 0.0001
Injury 1188 (71.5) 68 (91.0) 1.27 (0.99–1.63) < 0.052
Conversion 485 (29.2) 67 (89.7) 3.07 (2.38–3.97) < 0.0001
Rescheduling 180 (10.8) 12 (16.1) 1.48 (0.83–2.66) < 0.19 c
a Percentages are over total number of procedures in each column.
b Assuming that the level of underreporting across different surgical specialties is similar.
c Not statistically signiﬁcant because of the small number of samples (12) in the cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.t003
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with surgery, technical issues with the robot, and mistakes made by the surgical team. For the
majority of death events, little or no information was provided in the reports. About 50% of the
death events were indicated by the reporters to be related to inherent risks or complications of
surgery, 11.6% due to patient’s history or health state, and 7% were attributed to surgeon/staff
mistakes (e.g., incorrect instrument change or accidental cuts of artery). Of all the reported
deaths in different classes of surgery, at least 75.3% (64 of 86) happened after the procedure
(mainly due to patient history, infection/sepsis, or uncontrollable and heavy bleeding) and
17.4% (15 of 86) happened during the procedure. Of the deaths that occurred during the
Table 4. Major categories of malfunctions. (Note that the malfunction and surgical team action categories are not mutually exclusive, i.e., in many cases
more than one malfunction or action were reported in a single event.)
Malfunction
Category
No. of Reports Surgical Team Actions (% of malfunction category)
Description Total Event Type System
Reset
ProcedureConverted Procedure
Rescheduled
(% of
all)
M IN D O
System - System error codes and faults 536 231 330 133
Errors - System transferred into a
recoverable or non-recoverable
safety state
(5.0%) 44 23 1 468 (43.1%) (61.6%) (24.8%)
Video/ - Loss of video 275 21 18 0 236 53 145 94
Imaging
Problems
- Display of blurry images at
surgeon’s console or assistant’s
touchscreen
(2.6%) (19.3%) (52.7%) (34.2%)
Broken - Burnt/broken parts and
components
Pieces - Fell into surgical ﬁeld or body
cavity
1,557 1,396 119 1 41 3 38 5
Falling Into
Patients
- Required additional procedure
time to be found/removed from the
patient
(14.7%) (0.2%) (2.4%) (0.3%)
Broken Tip - Tears, burns, splits, holes on tip
cover
1,111 900 193 0 18 2 18 0
Covers or Elec.
Arcing
- Electrical arcing, sparking,
charring
(10.5%) (0.2%) (1.6%) (0.0%)
Unintended
Instrument
- Unintended or unstoppable
movements started without the
surgeon’s command
1,078 919 52 2 105 31 93 21
Operation - Instruments not recognized by
system
(10.1%) (2.9%) (8.6%) (1.9%)
- Instruments not working, open/
closed
Other - Cable, wire, tube, or instrument
damages and breakages
5,092 4,962 55 1 74 20 62 13
- Issues with electrosurgical units,
power supplies/cords, patient-side
manipulators, etc.
(47.9%) (0.4%) (1.2%) (0.3%)
- Other events reported as
“Malfunction
Total - All malfunctions 9,377 8,061 443 5 868 305 630 246
(% of all) (88.3%) (3.3%) (6.7%) (2.6%)
All Adverse Events 10,624 8,061 1,391 144 1,028 334 780 270
(100%) (3.1%) (7.3%) (2.5%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.t004
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procedures, five were due to inadvertent cuts or punctures of organs and the others were
related to complications such as uncontrolled bleeding, pulmonary embolism, and cardiac
arrest.
As Table 5 shows, about 62% of the injury events involved device malfunctions and the
rest were related to operator errors (7.1%), improper positioning of patient or port incisions
(6.3%), inherent risks of surgery (3.9%), or problems with grounding the equipment (1.5%). S4
Table lists example reports on device malfunctions that impacted patients during cardiotho-
racic procedures.
A more in-depth review of several injury and death reports showed that adverse events are
often not due to a single root cause (e.g., a given component failure or a human error), but a
combination of multiple causal factors and underlying conditions that lead to safety hazards
and incidents. For example, the report shown in Fig 1 (MAUDE report no. 2240665), describes
an event where an electronic component failure, a non-recoverable system error, inadequate
training and troubleshooting procedures for dealing with technical problems (non-recoverable
system errors), and possibly ineffective decisions made by human operators (surgeon deciding
Fig 4. Cumulative rates of malfunctions per procedure. The rates of malfunctions per procedure were obtained for each week (see S1 Fig for more details
on the estimation of the number of procedures).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.g004
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to manually operate the endoscopic camera instead of converting the procedure) each played
a role in a very long procedure time, loss of carbon dioxide insufflation, and consequently, a
patient injury. The following are the common flawed operational practices used by the surgical
team that contributed to catastrophic events during surgery:
• Inadequate experience with handling emergency situations
• Lack of training with specific system features
• Inadequate troubleshooting of technical problems
• Inadequate system/instrument checks before procedure
• Incorrect port placements
• Incorrect electro-cautery settings
• Incorrect cable connections
• Inadequate manipulation of robot master controls
• Inadequate coordination between hand & foot movements
• Incorrect manipulation or exchange of instruments
A more comprehensive analysis of multi-dimensional causes of incidents is the topic of the
future research.
Discussion
Our analysis shows an increasing number of adverse events related to the robotic surgical sys-
tems being reported. As cautioned by the FDA [7][37], the number of MAUDE reports may
not be used to evaluate the changes in rates of events over time, because the increased reporting
Table 5. Summary of death and injury reports (2000–2012).
Death Reports (Total = 86)
Example Causes Number of Reports (%)
Surgeon/staff mistake 6 (7.0%)
Patient’s history 10 (11.6%)
Inherent risks and complications 43 (50.0%)
N/A 27 (31.4%)
During Procedure Punctures, bleeding, pulmonary embolism, cardiac arrest 15 (17.4%)
After Procedure Infection/sepsis, heavy bleeding 64 (75.3%)
Injury Reports (Total = 410)
Example Causes Number of Reports (%)
Device malfunctions 254 (62.0%)
Surgeon/staff mistake 29 (7.1%)
Improper positioning of the patient led to post-operation complications such
as nerve damage
17 (4.1%)
Inherent risks of surgery and patient history 16 (3.9%)
Burning of tissues near port incisions 9 (2.2%)
Possible passing of the electrosurgical unit currents through instruments to
the patient body
6 (1.5%)
Surgeon felt shocking at the surgeon-side console 2 (0.5%)
N/A 77 (18.8%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151470.t005
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of events may be due to different factors, e.g., the increasing use of surgical systems [1], changes
in the manufacturers’ reporting practices [36], and/or better awareness and increased publicity
resulting from product recalls, media coverage, and litigation [37]. Therefore, we measured the
prevalence of adverse events in each year by estimating the number of events reported per pro-
cedure. We found that despite a relatively high number of reports, the vast majority of proce-
dures were successful and did not involve any problems and the number of injuries/death
events per procedure has stayed relatively constant since 2007. However, total number of mal-
functions reported per procedure (0.46%, 95% confidence interval (CI), 0.45–0.47%) was about
6 times lower than the average number of malfunctions per procedure (3%, 95% confidence
interval (CI), 1.9–4.2) published by different surgical institutions (see S2 Table). Also the total
number of injuries and deaths reported per procedure (0.08%, 95% confidence interval (CI),
0.08–0.09%) was about the same as the predicted complication rates for robotic surgery [42]
but an order of magnitude less than the lowest rate of complications reported for robotic sur-
gery in previous studies (2% [43]) (see S1 Table). This further confirms the uncertainty in the
rates of events due to possible under-reporting in MAUDE data and possible changes in report-
ing practices.
Our analysis shows that estimated number of events per procedure in complex surgical areas,
such as cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery were significantly higher than gynecology,
urology, and general surgeries. Although not all the reported injuries and deaths were due to
device problems, and the procedure conversions, of themselves, cannot be considered adverse
events [44][45], the estimated numbers of injury/death events and conversions per procedure
can be used as a metric to measure the difficulty experienced in different surgical specialties. The
best that we can tell from the available data is that the higher number of injury, death, and con-
version per adverse event, in cardiothoracic and head and neck surgeries, could be indirectly
explained by the higher complexity of the procedures, less frequent use of robotic devices, and
less robotic expertise in these fields. Although the use of robotic technology has rapidly grown in
urology and gynecology for prostatectomy and hysterectomy, it has been slow to percolate into
more complex areas of cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery. Between 2007 and 2013, over
1.4 million (86%) robotic procedures in gynecology and urology were performed in the U.S.,
while the number of procedures in other surgical specialties altogether was less than 250,000
(14.2%) [1]. The limitations of the robotic user interface [46], long procedure times [47], steep
learning curve [48][49], and higher costs for purchase and maintenance of robotic systems and
instruments [50] are some factors that may have contributed to the lower utilization of the
robotic approach in more complex surgical procedures. For example, only a select type of robotic
cardiac procedures are reported to have been successfully performed using the robots, such as
mitral valve repair and internal mammary artery harvest [51][52][53]. The experiences of highly
competent robotic teams that performed multi-vessel coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG)
showed that the robotic approach may be associated with higher mortality and morbidity rates
compared to open surgery [54]. In head and surgery, there may be the problem of close anatomi-
cal proximity to many vascular and neurological structures that may increase procedural com-
plexity. Also, bleeding when it occurs may be difficult to control because of increased vascularity.
In practice, the use of the robotic platform involves the interface of a sophisticated machine
with surgical teams, in an area of patient care that is safety-critical. From a technology perspec-
tive, employing substantially improved safety practices and controls in the design, operation,
and validation of robotic surgical systems could prevent some of the reported events. Some
examples include:
• Improved human-machine interfaces and surgical simulators that train surgical teams for
handling technical problems [55][56] and assess their actions in real-time during the surgery.
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• Providing real-time feedback to the surgeon on the safe surgical paths that can be taken or
safety barriers that prevent the robotic tools to enter to certain portions in the surgical work-
space [57], based on the patient-specific anatomical models, as well as surgeon-specific
modeling and monitoring of robotic surgical motions [58], to minimize the risk of approach-
ing dangerous limits and inadvertent patient injuries.
• New safety engines for monitoring of procedures (including surgeon, patient, and device sta-
tus) and providing comprehensive feedback to surgical team on upcoming events and trou-
bleshooting procedures to prevent long procedure interruptions.
• Improved mechanisms for logging and reporting of incidents experienced during procedures
to enable more accurate validation of safety and effectiveness of surgical systems.
Limitations
The results of our study come with the caveats that: (i) inherent risks exist in all surgical proce-
dures (more so in complex procedures), (ii) the non-device-related adverse events (e.g., caused
by human errors) are less likely to be reported to the MAUDE database, and (iii) the MAUDE
database suffers from underreporting and inconsistencies. Thus, the estimated number of
adverse events per procedure are likely to be lower than the actual numbers in robotic surgery.
Further, the lack of detailed information in the reports makes it difficult to determine the exact
causes and circumstances underlying the events. Therefore, the sensitivity of adverse event
trends to changes in reporting mechanisms, surgical team expertise, and inherent risks of sur-
gery could not be assessed based on this data.
Conclusions
While the robotic surgical systems have been successfully adopted in many different specialties,
this study demonstrates several important findings: (i) the overall numbers of injury and death
events per procedure have stayed relatively constant over the years, (ii) the probability of events
in complex surgical specialties of cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery has been higher
than other specialties, (iii) device and instrument malfunctions have affected thousands of
patients and surgical teams by causing complications and prolonged procedure times.
As the surgical systems continue to evolve with new technologies, uniform standards for
surgical team training, advanced human machine interfaces, improved accident investigation
and reporting mechanisms, and safety-based design techniques should be developed to reduce
incident rates in the future.
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